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Families: Of Parents and Children
Chapter 1
The Goods of Parenting1
Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift
Introduction
This chapter aims to identify the distinctive contribution that parent–child relationships
make to the well-being or flourishing of adults.2 The claim that those relationships are
very important for children—perhaps especially for their emotional development—is
widely accepted; we subscribe to that consensus. But the idea that adults benefit from
parenting children, while no less familiar, warrants more careful attention than it has
generally received.3 By giving it that attention, we hope to challenge some conventional
ways—often so taken-for-granted as to be unstated—in which parents think about their
children. In particular, we query the significance of the biological connection between
parent and child.
Though rarely conceived in such terms, it is widely believed that adults who get
to parent children enjoy goods in their lives that are not realizable through alternative
1 This chapter draws on material in our Family Values (Brighouse and Swift,
forthcoming).
2 In this chapter we treat “well-being” and “flourishing” as synonymous, varying our
usage only to avoid repetition. For us, anything that “benefits” a person makes her life
better for her and should be understood as contributing to her well-being or flourishing.
3 In addition to the works cited later, see Austin (2007) and Richards (2010).
relationships however intimate or loving, such as those with lovers, friends, or pets.
Certainly many adults who desire strongly to become parents would reject the view that
these other relationships can be adequate substitutes. They could be wrong: people can
want things that do not in fact make their lives go better. This is not just a matter of their
discovering, with hindsight, that something they wanted turns out to be something they
would rather not have had. People can spend their whole lives believing things in it were
good for them when, in fact, those things made their lives worse. So some of those who
want to be parents may be mistaken about what will be good for them—perhaps, for
them, other relationships would be as good or better—and some who are parents and
think that being a parent is good for them may be mistaken about that too. Also, and
perhaps more interestingly, people can misunderstand what is good about the things they
are right to value. Parenting is indeed special, and especially valuable. But what makes it
special is not necessarily what those who want to be parents think is special about it;
some, we suggest, value parenting for the wrong reasons.
Why Parents?
It’s easy to see why children should be looked after by adults, but we could imagine a
system in which different adults were in charge of them at different ages—specialists in
dealing with young babies being replaced by experts on toddlers, who in turn would cede
authority to those with advanced qualifications on the development of 4–5 year olds, and
so on. Or if we thought continuity of care was important, new-born babies could be
handed over to state-run childrearing institutions staffed by well-qualified professionals.
Or perhaps groups of twenty or thirty adults living together in communes could share the
tasks of childrearing between them, with no particular child being the particular
responsibility of any particular adult. In none of these alternatives would children have
parents, as we will understand that term, and societies that reared their children those
ways would not have families.
How does one go about evaluating childrearing arrangements? Some philosophers
think that there are things that societies must (or must not) do to or for people irrespective
of whether doing (or not doing) those things will make people’s lives go better. But we
focus on the well-being interests of the different parties who have a stake in the matter.
First, and most obviously, there are children; their vulnerability, and the fact that,
however they are raised, they cannot be thought to have had any say in the matter, are so
glaring that it is hard to hold that their interests play no role. Second, there are adults;
adults too may flourish less or more depending on their society’s rules about how they
may and may not be involved in the process of childrearing. Third, there are third parties;
whether or not an individual is herself directly involved in raising children, she will
surely be affected by the way her society goes about it, since childrearing arrangements
are bound to have what economists call externalities.
Though useful for analytical purposes, this tripartite division doesn’t identify
distinct people. Not all children become adults, alas, but all adults were once children;
and all people, both children and adults, suffer or enjoy the negative or positive
externalities of other people’s childrearing arrangements. This framework is an
intellectual tool for thinking about the distinct ways in which we are all affected by
decisions about how children should be raised. Any individual, thinking just about what
is best for herself, will seek to combine these different perspectives and come up with an
all things considered judgement about which childrearing practices would be, or would
have been, best for her overall. We can approach the social decision in essentially the
same way.
This chapter focuses on the value of parenting to parents because that is relatively
unexplored territory, not because we think adults’ interests are more important than
children’s, nor because we think the interests of third parties are irrelevant. If the kind of
relationship we are going to describe were not also good for children, then it could not
justify the practice of parenting. If childrearing arrangements that were valuable for
parents and children were damaging to third parties, then that too would count
importantly against them. But the idea that, generally speaking, children are better raised
if they experience this kind of relationship is well established: basic attachment theory
and other staples of child development all point in that direction (Waldfogel, 2006). It is
conventional also to regard parent–child relationships as crucial for turning children into
law-abiding, cooperative fellow citizens. (Witness the popular concern that young
people’s lack of discipline is due to parental failure: Morse, 1999.)
The fact that people want something doesn’t mean they should be allowed, or
helped, to get it. Perhaps, instead, the activity of parenting should be distributed only to
those who would do it best. Would there be anything wrong with a system that distributed
children to adults in a way that maximized the realization of children’s interests, even if it
left out some adults who would be willing, and adequately good, parents? We think there
would. To be a parent is to have a certain kind of relationship with a child, and in our
view many adults have a weighty interest in enjoying that kind of relationship. The
relationship contributes extremely valuable and non-substitutable benefits to adults’
lives—goods which we call “familial relationship goods”. For many, parenting a child
makes a distinctive and weighty contribution to their well-being as adults. It is distinctive
in that it cannot be substituted by other forms of relationship, and, we claim, the goods in
question are important enough to impose a duty on others to allow, and indeed to enable,
adults to enjoy them
What’s Special about Parenting?
For most people, intimate relationships with others are essential if their lives are to have
meaning for them. Rather than being alone in the world, seeking to fulfil their own
pleasures, people thrive when they are connected to other human beings with whom they
enjoy deep and close relationships. These relationships are challenging—in an intimate
relationship one does not fully control the response of the other person, and one has to
discern her interests even when she does not necessarily articulate them well, and act to
further those interests and come to share some of them as one’s own. The love and
voluntary compliance of others in a relationship, when recognized, results in a sense of
well-being and self-worth, as does successful attendance to the well-being of those
others. A life without such relationships, or in which they all fail, is usually an
unsuccessful life.
But our intimate relationships are not all the same—they are not substitutable one
for another. People need more than one kind. Most need, usually, a romantic lover,
someone to whom we can bare our raw emotions and whom we are confident will love us
anyway, with whom we share sexual love. We need close friendships that last, if not a
whole lifetime then some long part of it, with people on whom we can rely for support
when in need and who we know can rely on us, with whom we can share our joys and
interests. We also need more casual relationships—relationships of trust with people
whose lives we do not know intimately but with whom we form bonds around some
particular shared interest, project, or adversity. A successful life is a life with a variety of
successful relationships, including a variety of successful intimate relationships.
We believe that many, perhaps most, adults need to be involved in an intimate
relationship of a very particular kind in order to have a fully flourishing life. The parent–
child relationship is not, in our view, just another intimate relationship, valuable to both
sides but substitutable for the adult by an additional relationship with a consenting adult.
The relationship is, on the contrary, sui generis, a relationship that involves the adult in a
quite unique combination of joys and challenge; experiencing and meeting these makes a
distinctive set of demands, and produces a distinctive contribution to well-being. Other
intimate relationships have their own value, but they are not substitutes for a parenting
relationship with a child.4
The parent is charged with responsibility for both the immediate well-being of the
child and the development of the child’s capacities. The child has immediate interests in
being kept safe, enjoying herself, being sheltered and well nourished, having loving
relationships with proximate others, etc. She has future interests in many of these same
things, but also in becoming the kind of person who is not entirely dependent on others
for having her interests met, and the kind of person who can make her own judgements
about her interests, and act on them. The parent’s fiduciary duties are to guarantee the
child’s immediate well-being, including assuring to her the intrinsic goods of childhood
4 Frederick Schoemann (1980) puts the interest in intimacy central but fails to recognize
the distinctive features of the intimacy specific to parent–child relationships. An account
that shares some of the features of ours can be found in MacLeod (2002).
(see Brennan, in this volume), and to oversee her cognitive, emotional, physical, and
moral development. Four broad features of this relationship combine to make the joys
and challenges of parenting different from those that attend other kinds of relationship,
including other kinds of fiduciary relationship.
First, obviously, parents and children cannot have equal power. Children are not
in the relationship voluntarily and, unlike adults they lack the power to exit the
relationship at least until they reach sufficient age to escape (which age will be culturally
sensitive, since different societies will monitor and enforce parental power with different
levels of enthusiasm and effectiveness). Children are vulnerable to the decisions and
choice-making of their primary caretakers, and, initially, wholly dependent on them for
their well-being. An adult supervising a child has the power of life or death; and this is
not, at least when the child is young, reciprocated. But, more importantly, and less
spectacularly, they have the power to make the child’s lives miserable or enjoyable
(within limits, at least at the enjoyable end).
The second difference between this and most other fiduciary relationships
concerns the paternalistic aspect. The parent–child relationship routinely involves
coercing the child to act against her own will, or manipulating her will so that it accords
with her interests. So, for example, we might lock away the bleach so that she cannot get
at it, even though she has displayed great interest in it, or prevent her from having a third
helping of ice cream, on the grounds that neither the bleach nor the ice cream will serve
her interests. We might persistently serve whole-grain pasta in the face of her frequent
(and accurate) complaints that it is tasteless, in order to habituate her to frequent intake of
whole grains. We might engineer her social life in order to diminish the significance of a
destructive friendship. Although in relationships with other adults we are obliged to take
their interests into account, we do not have fiduciary responsibilities of this kind towards
them. Indeed, if one saw one’s relationship with, say, one’s spouse, in this way, one
could reasonably be accused of being overbearing, disrespectful, or unloving. In intimate
relationships with other adults one might advise and even argue but one does not
routinely coerce and manipulate, even in the other’s interests. To do so would be to fail as
a spouse or friend, just as to refrain from doing so with one’s children would be to fail as
a parent. And where we do have distinctively fiduciary relationships with other adults—
even with ageing parents—coercing or manipulating them may sometimes be required
but it is not itself a key part of the job.
A third difference concerns the relationship of the fiduciary (the parent) to the
interests of the principal (the child). When the parent–child relationship begins, the child
does not have specific beliefs about what is good for her. Later, when she does have
beliefs, they have been formed in response to the environment structured by the parent
and, if the parent has been caring for the child, by someone whose capacities have been
shaped by the parent. The parent has a good deal of latitude in shaping the child’s
emerging values, values that will guide her in her own life. In other fiduciary
relationships what the fiduciary should pursue on the principal’s behalf is typically fixed
by reference to the principal’s own beliefs about what is good for her, sometimes
expressed directly to the fiduciary, sometimes (as in the case of advanced directives)
expressed previously. But the parent does not have and could not have such a standard to
guide her. The parent should be guided, rather, by those interests of the child that it is the
parent’s fiduciary duty to respect and promote. Of course there will be differing accounts
of what those interests are but, in our view, one important parental duty is to try to ensure
that the child will become an autonomous agent, someone capable of judging, and acting
on her judgements about, her own interests. This is a lengthy process, and one that does
not just naturally occur but requires active support. It is, for most parents, emotionally as
well as practically challenging to prepare a child who has been entirely dependent, and
whom the parent loves deeply, to become her own person, capable of effectively
challenging the parent and the parent’s values; capable, ultimately, of rejecting the adult
if she thinks it appropriate. Three natural inclinations are frequently at odds with trying to
ensure the child’s genuine independence: the inclination to be protective of the loved
child, the inclination to promote her well-being according to one’s own view of what that
would amount to, and the inclination to hold on to her for one’s own sake. To overcome
these inclinations successfully, when one really loves one’s child, is emotionally
demanding. Successful parenting is, in this respect, an exercise in maturation because,
while the parent has the control that he needs in order to carry out his caring and
fiduciary tasks for the child, he simultaneously learns that one should not control another
person in the way he might like, and learns how not to exercise some of the control he
does indeed have. For example, the parent must give the child opportunities for emotional
and physical independence, putting the child in situations where she is at risk of failing,
but in which the stakes of failure are sufficiently low that the child will be able to bear,
and learn from, failure if it happens.
The fiduciary responsibilities of parenthood constitute a distinctive moral burden.
But, of course, along with the moral burden come distinctive sources of satisfaction of a
much less complicated kind. What children need from parents is not simply the judicious
exercise of expertise and authority, of the kind one might hope for from a lawyer or
doctor or teacher. What’s needed is a relationship, and the kind of relationship children
need from adults—a parent–child relationship—is also the kind that yields good things to
the adults doing the parenting. There is the enjoyment of the love (both the child’s for
oneself and one’s own for the child), but also the enjoyment of the observations the child
makes about the world; the pleasure (and sometimes dismay) of seeing the world from
the child’s perspective; enjoyment of her satisfaction in her successes and of consoling
her in her disappointments.
The final difference from other relationships, then, concerns the quality of the
intimacy of the relationship. The love a parent normally receives from his children, again
especially in the early years, is spontaneous and unconditional, and, in particular, outside
the rational control of the young child. She shares herself unselfconsciously with the
parent, revealing her enthusiasms and aversions, fears and anxieties, in an uncontrolled
manner. She trusts the adult in charge until the trust is betrayed, and trust must be
betrayed consistently and frequently for it to be completely undermined. Adults do not
share themselves with each other in this way: intimacy requires a considerable act of will
on the part of adults interacting together. But things are different between parents and
children. The parent is bound by his fiduciary responsibilities for the child’s emotional
development to try to be spontaneous and authentic a good deal of the time, both because
the child needs to see this modelled and because the child needs to be in a loving
relationship with a real, emotionally available, person. And, of course, the parent will
often be inclined to be spontaneously loving. But his fiduciary obligations also often
require him to be less than wholly spontaneous and intimate (despite the child’s
unconditional intimacy with him). The good parent sometimes masks his disappointment
with, sometimes his pride in, the child, and often his frustration with other aspects of his
life. He may sometimes hide his amusement at some naughtiness of the child, preferring
to chide her for the sake of instilling discipline; conversely he may sometimes control his
anger at similar behaviour, substituting inauthentic kindness for the sake of ensuring a
better end to the child’s day, or because he knows that his angry reaction is, though
authentic, inappropriate. He does not inflict on the child, as the child does on him, all of
his spontaneous reactions, and all of his emotional responses.
These four features combine to make the relationship between parent and child
unlike other intimate relationships, and unlike other fiduciary relationships. Children
have a weighty interest in the kind of relationship that will meet their needs and promote
their vital interests. Given what that involves—given how complex, interesting, and
conducive to the adult’s own emotional development it is to be the adult in that
relationship—adults too have a weighty interest in being in a parenting relationship. The
interest is distinctive, because what the relationship requires of the adult, and allows the
adult to experience, is unique. It cannot be substituted even by other intimate
relationships where those are consensual on both sides and in which the parties are
symmetrically situated. The relationship as a whole, with its particular intimate character,
and the responsibility to play the specific fiduciary role for the person with whom one is
intimate in that way, is what adults have an interest in.
The fiduciary aspect to the parental relationship with children has been widely
acknowledged since Locke, and is given particular emphasis by so-called “child-centred”
justifications of the family.5 Our claim is adult-centred: many adults have an interest in
being in a relationship of this sort. They have a non-fiduciary interest in being in a
relationship in which they act as a child’s fiduciary. That relationship enables them to
exercise and develop capacities the development and exercise of which are crucial to
their living fully flourishing lives. The parent comes to learn more about herself, she
comes to change as a person, and she experiences pleasures and emotions that otherwise
would be unavailable.
We need to tread carefully here. It should be clear that the adult’s interest in
playing the fiduciary role is not entirely independent of the content of that role. It’s
because of what children need from their parents that adults have such a weighty interest
in giving it to them.
Imagine a world in which human children didn’t need much more looking after
than guinea pigs, or those Tamagotchi toys that were so popular a while back. Imagine
that they could fully develop into autonomous, emotionally adjusted adults, and enjoy the
intrinsic goods of childhood, with that kind and level of input from adults. We think that,
even in that hypothetical world, there would be some value to being the person
5 Locke (1988) says “parents were, by the Law of Nature, under an obligation to preserve,
nourish, and educate the Children they had begotten; [though] not as their own
Workmanship, but as the Workmanship of their own Maker, the Almighty to whom they
were to be accountable for them” (p. 180, sec. 56). Contemporary theorists who
emphasize the fiduciary interest, despite giving otherwise different accounts of the
relationship, include Reich (2002: 148–51); Galston (2002: 101–6); Callan (1997: ch. 6);
Dwyer (1999); Brennan and Noggle (1997); and Archard (2004).
responsible for ensuring that children’s interests were met. One would be responsible for
the development of a human child, which is a weighty responsibility indeed, and it is
good for people, it makes their lives go better, to take on that degree of responsibility. So
when we say that, in our world, playing the fiduciary role contributes importantly to the
flourishing of (most) adults, the sheer fact of being the person responsible for the child is
part of the story.
But only part of it. Properly to see the weight of the adult interest in parenting, we
need to keep our eye not on the plain fact of being the fiduciary but on the content of
what children need from those who are their fiduciaries. Adults have an interest in being
the fiduciary, and parents’ serving as fiduciaries affects the significance, and hence the
value, of so much else that happens in the relationship. But what’s really valuable here is
not being the fiduciary per se but having the kind of relationship that, in fact, is in
children’s interests. It’s that kind of relationship which presents a distinctive challenge,
and that kind of challenge that gives adults unique opportunities for flourishing.
Adults can be involved in any number of fiduciary relationships. In our
professional lives, as lawyers or social workers or doctors or teachers, we take on duties
to serve the interests of our clients or patients or students. In our personal lives, too, we
may find ourselves acting as fiduciaries for our ageing parents, for example, if they cease
to be able adequately to protect and promote their own interests. If we think about the
difference between these other kinds of fiduciary relationships, and the particular case of
the parent–child relationship, we can see that some elements in what is special about
being a fiduciary for a child concern the fact that what we’re talking about here is a child.
Relevant here is the moral standing of the person for whom one is acting as fiduciary: her
possessing the capacity to develop into an autonomous adult, her degree of vulnerability
to one’s judgements, her involuntary dependence on one, and so on. Failing adequately to
discharge one’s fiduciary duties to a child would be different from failing to discharge
those owed to a client or patient, or even to an ageing parent, even if what was involved
in fulfilling the duties were the same. But of course they are not the same. Other elements
in what is special about being a fiduciary for a child concern what it is that children need
from their fiduciaries. They need a special kind of relationship—a relationship in which
the adult offers love and authority, a complex and emotionally challenging combination
of openness and restraint, of spontaneity and self-monitoring, of sharing and withholding.
It’s that kind of relationship that many adults have an interest in.6
To be sure, the fiduciary aspect remains central. Grandparents, uncles and aunts,
parents’ friends, or nannies, can have close relationships with children, and when they go
well those relationships will be conducive to the child’s interests and valuable to the
adults too. Reading bedtime stories, providing meals, and so on will be contributing to
the well-being of both. But there’s something distinctively valuable about being the
person who not only does those things oneself but has the responsibility to make sure
they get done, sometimes by others, and the authority to decide quite how they get done.
6 It’s an interesting question how many parents a child can have consistent with this kind
of relationship. Single-parent families clearly qualify, and we see no reason why three or
four parents should not share the parenting of a child. More than that and we would start
to worry about the dilution of intimacy and authority inherent in “parenting by
committee”. For discussion see Brennan and Cameron (n.d.).
The challenge is different, and the adult who meets that challenge enjoys a special, and
especially valuable, kind of human flourishing.7
Is our Picture of Parenting Too Rosy?
Our emphasis on the fiduciary aspect of parenting points to something paradoxical about
the widespread desire to be a parent. That is a desire to take on burdens, voluntarily to put
oneself in the position of owing things to others that severely limit one’s capacity to
pursue other goals.8 We have tried to explain what adults get out of the relationship, as it
were, in a way that helps to make sense of the paradox, but we suspect that some readers
will find our account of the joys of family life somewhat naïve or complacent, and
suspiciously optimistic in its neglect of the burdens that accompany parenthood.
For many, parenthood is indeed a source of deep anxiety and frustration. It is a
vital source of flourishing only if it is carried out in a social environment that renders its
challenges superable. So, for example, poverty and the multiple disadvantages that
accompany it can easily create a micro-environment in which it is very difficult even to
develop, let alone to exercise, the cognitive and emotional skills that successful parenting
requires. Meanwhile children raised in poverty are typically at much higher risk of very
bad outcomes than more advantaged children, so that parents seeking conscientiously to
7 Nannies sometimes experience an almost complete variant of the full package—
effectively doing most of the parenting. In our view, one of the tragedies in that
relationship is that its security is vulnerable to the arbitrary power of the child’s official
“parents”.
8 That is why Alstott (2004) argues her case for financial support for parents by appeal to
the idea that they should be compensated for their loss of autonomy.
protect their children from such outcomes require greater internal resources than are
needed by the parents of more advantaged children. Adults have a weighty interest in
parenting a child in circumstances that will indeed enable them to realize the goods we
have identified. In another context, we might follow this thought through to explore the
implications for social policy of our account of “family values”.9
But parenting a child is not all-consuming. It’s true that, done properly, raising a
child severely limits on one’s opportunities to do other things. Some people choose not to
be parents for precisely that reason. It’s true also that raising a child is likely to be one of
the most important things one does with one’s life. As Eamonn Callan (1997: 142) says,
“success or failure in the task, as measured by whatever standards we take to be relevant,
is likely to affect profoundly our overall sense of how well or badly our lives have gone”.
But although the interest in the fiduciary aspect of the role is important, parents should
not be slaves, entirely and continually subordinating their own interests to those of their
children, or always putting their children first. We cannot here set out in any detail what
rights parents should have with respect to the children they parent, but it may be helpful
to outline briefly two different ways in which parenting is not like slavery.
On the one hand, parents are not only parents. Quite how much of one’s time and
energy parenting demands will of course vary with the age and particular characteristics
of the child, but generally speaking it is perfectly possible to parent well while
performing other roles and pursuing other interests. It is common to talk about the “best
interests” of the child, and that may indeed be an appropriate practical criterion for
adjudicating custody disputes where things have gone wrong in some way and the child is
9 For some thoughts in this direction, see Brighouse and Swift (2008).
likely to be at serious risk of serious harm. But it is not plausible to demand that parents
always and single-mindedly pursue their child’s best interests. Adults who parent also
have lives of their own to lead and it is quite appropriate for them sometimes to weigh
their own interests, and those of others, against those of their children. Imagine someone
who, as well as being a parent, and accepting our view of the fiduciary duties that attend
that role, also believes—let us assume rightly—that he has a moral obligation to take part
in a political demonstration. Imagine further that he cannot find alternative childcare, so
he has to choose between taking his child with him or not going on the demonstration. He
accepts that going on the demonstration is not in his child’s best interests; those would be
better served by their staying home, or going to the zoo instead—the child is not old
enough for going on the demonstration plausibly to benefit her in any way at all. As long
as going on the demonstration does no harm to the child, bringing or leaving her below
some level we might think of as ‘good enough’, he does indeed have the right to go with
her on the demonstration. That is not a right he has qua parent. But it is a right that makes
a difference to what he may do with his child.
But we can go further. It is in children’s interests that their parents have their
own, independent, interests and pursuits, and in children’s interests too that their
relationship with their parents be one in which their parents are not required always to act
with their children’s best interests in mind. Someone who was only a parent—someone
for whom “parent” was the entire content of their identity—would not be providing the
kind of experience that children need, and the parent–child relationship would surely
implode in a kind of self-referential black hole. (Of course, that can happen even when
the parent does have other identities and interests—if he fails to get the balance right—
but it looks inevitable if he doesn’t.) It is important for children to experience their
parents as independent people, with their own lives to lead, not as people whose sole
purpose in life is to serve them. So the task of parenting, although indeed extremely
demanding, by its very nature allows parents discretionary time and energy: having a life
of one’s own is, in fact, part of the job description. The point here is not simply that it’s
good for children if parents get some time off for themselves, or good for children that
they have a sense of their parent as having independent interests. The parent’s non-
parental interests will, and indeed should, manifest themselves, at least sometimes, in the
interactions between parent and child. Parents must allow themselves some space, free of
self-monitoring, to experience and express to the child their authentic emotions and
attitudes. A parent who never said or did anything to or with his child without first asking
himself whether it would be in his child’s interests would not be spontaneously sharing
himself with his child, there would be a lack of genuine intimacy, and he would thus be
failing to provide the kind of relationship that was in his child’s interests. Paradoxically,
the kind of parent–child relationship that is good for children is one in which the parent
cares about things other than his children, and doesn’t spend all his time thinking about,
and then trying to deliver, what would be good for them.
Four Clarifications
Four further points of clarification are important. First, we are not saying that there are
many adults who cannot flourish at all without relationships of the kind we have
described. People do indeed go to great lengths in order to raise children, and some
consider the inability to do so as a profound blight on their lives, but few who miss out
conclude that their lives are thereby worthless. Nonetheless, many regard themselves as
having missed out on an experience that would have been necessary for them fully to
flourish. Our claim is of that kind—about the contribution parent–child relationships
make to a fully flourishing human life.
But, second, this is not true of all adults. A significant proportion of people have
no desire to raise children, and for many of them the absence of this desire is not an
epistemic failing—they are not making a mistake. We are not claiming that all adults
need to raise children fully to flourish, and we recognize, further, that there are some for
whom parenting would make no contribution to their well-being, and some for whom it
would make their lives go worse. That the relevant relationship goods contribute
importantly to the flourishing of the rights holder does not imply that those goods are
good for everybody. In this respect the contribution of this kind of relationship is like that
of a romantic sexual relationship. Many people are such that they could not flourish fully
without it: it contributes something to their flourishing that nothing else could contribute.
Others, however, have no need for it. Similarly there may be people who do not need to
be parents: those who, although they might really enjoy parenting, could indeed flourish
fully without it, and those whose lives would actually be diminished by being a parent. In
some cases that might be because the person lacks the capacities needed properly to
discharge the fiduciary duties (Cassidy, 2006). This does not contradict our general claim
about the significance of the relationship.
Third, it may be objected that some parents abandon their children and have little
contact. Indeed, even in the nuclear family that emerged after industrialization, fathers
have often had very limited time and intimacy with their children. But none of this shows
that adults can live well without parenting relationships, for we can ask whether they
have really have enjoyed fully flourishing lives. In our terms, such people have not in fact
been parents at all—they may have helped to create the child, and, in the latter case, they
may have provided the financial support necessary for someone else (usually the
biological mother) to fulfil the parenting role. (Imagine a society in which the costs of
raising children had been fully socialized, so that the citizenry as a whole supported
children and those raising them. The job of parenting would still exist, and parent–child
relationships would be just as important, but it and they would have been separated from
financial provision.) The traditional gendered division of labour, in addition to being
unjust towards women, has tended to deprive men of something very valuable—a
parenting relationship properly understood.
Finally, some parent–child relationships lack some of the features that contribute
to the flourishing of the parent, while other kinds of relationship contain some of them.
So, for example, the parent of a child with severe cognitive impairments might
experience loving intimacy, and the joy in seeing the world reflected through the eyes of
someone for whom she acts as fiduciary in some respects, but her fiduciary obligations
do not include preparing her child to become an autonomous adult. Maybe some children,
perhaps those on the far end of the autism spectrum, cannot be intimate with the parent in
the way that we have described as being so important and rewarding. Pet owners take on
fiduciary obligations, and some have emotionally rich relationships with their pets, as do
many who care for adults with severe cognitive impairments, and for the infirm elderly.
So not only does our account of the relationship at stake fail to capture every parent–child
relationship, but the contrast between it and other caring relationships is not always as
stark as we might have been taken to think. Our conception of the parent–child
relationship describes something that many adults have a very strong interest in
participating in. Other relationships that resemble it to a greater or lesser degree will yield
some of the benefits, but not all. Some of those other relationships will yield benefits for
some of the carers that are not made available by our conception of the parent–child
relationship.
Alternative Accounts
Our “familial relationship goods” approach to the value of parenting can usefully be
contrasted with other approaches. Our analysis is unusual in separating (i) why children
should be raised by parents at all and (ii) which children should be parented by which
adults. It offers, in Archard and Benatar’s terms, an “indirect” justification of any answer
to the second question, first justifying the institution of parenthood and then distributing
parental roles within that institution (Benatar and Archard, 2010: 18–21). Most answers
to the second question, and certainly those prevalent among non-philosophers, offer a
direct justification—for example, by appeal to a causal relation between the child and the
adult who, it is argued, has a claim to parent her. That kind of answer makes no appeal to
the “value” of parenting, at least not in the sense that we have been conceiving it: there is
no invocation here of the idea that the parent–child relationship makes a distinctive
contribution to human well-being. The thought is more likely to be that the person who
brought the child into existence has a right to be its parent, in our sense, with that right
not being grounded in any claim about the goods or benefits likely to accrue from that
way of justifying or distributing parenthood. From that perspective, whether parenting is
valuable, for either parent or child, plays no role in answering either question.
Some of a libertarian persuasion may see the right to parent a child one has
procreated as an application of the more general right to own that which one has
produced with one’s own body. The relationship that matters here is the ownership
relationship, which gives the procreative parent certain control rights over the child that
in some sense “belongs” to the parent. Another view that also makes biology central
points rather to the investment that biological parents, especially gestating mothers, make
in “their” children. Bearing the costs and labours of pregnancy gives one a right to parent
the child one has worked so hard to produce. This variant on the proprietarian
perspective—the idea that the parent “deserves” to parent the child in return for past
labours—again gives no special weight to the kind or quality of the relationship between
parent and child once it is born nor to the value of that kind of relationship to either
parent or child.10
But it is also possible to accept the structure of our argument, and our emphasis
on “familial relationship goods”, while giving it and them different content. For example,
some believe that there is a particular value to an adult in having a relationship with a
child in which one is able to pass on some aspects of oneself to that child—perhaps one’s
genes, perhaps one’s values, perhaps one’s property. The adult interest in parenting, on
such a view, does derive from something about the value of a distinctive connection
between parent and child; there is something important that one is able to achieve by
parenting a child that would not otherwise be available. That may be passing one’s
10 For discussion of various views about the (alleged) interest in procreation, see Overall
(in this volume). For a view that emphasizes the significance of the gestatory
relationship, rather than genetic connection, see Gheaus (2012).
deepest religious or cultural commitments on to future generations, extending oneself
beyond death, achieving a distinctive kind of connection to posterity, or seeing the fruits
of one’s labour enjoyed by those whom one loves.
By way of illustration, let us focus on the first of these. Colin MacLeod (2010)
identifies a motive of “creative self-extension” which “arises out of the special
opportunity. . . . parents have to express their own commitment to ideals and ground-
projects by passing them on to their children. . . . We can see ourselves carried forward in
another self we played a significant role in creating” (p. 142). MacLeod seems to endorse
this, which brings together two, distinct, motives: one concerning expression of one’s
own commitment to one’s projects and values, the other concerning the carrying forward
of one’s own self through a creative process. While accepting that parents may often find
acting on both motives successfully can be a profound source of “satisfaction”, and that
in practice parents may often act on these motives, we doubt that they should play any
role in grounding adults’ claims to parent children.
There are many ways to express commitment to projects and values, and for many
projects and values influencing other people to take notice of them, take them seriously,
or adopt them, is part of what it is to be committed to them, or a natural accompaniment
to being committed to them. One’s children are, like other people, potential adopters. But,
as our account of the specificity of the parent–child relationship emphasizes, to parent a
child is to have a special kind of power over the emerging values of another human
being. The kind of relationship that will deliver the goods we have identified is indeed
one in which parents will have some scope to influence their child’s emerging values—
they will do this as an unintended by-product of the spontaneous sharing of themselves
with their children, and they may do it deliberately to the (in our view limited) extent to
which the relationship’s yielding its benefits requires some degree of shared values
between parent and child. The parent’s concern to promote her child’s well-being may
also have implications for the ways in which she may act to shape the child’s emerging
values—for example, where the parent believes that her child’s endorsing a particular
project or value will be important for the child’s living a successful life.11 But for a parent
to ensure that her child in particular shares some specific value or project out of
commitment to that value or project rather than out of commitment to the child and the
relationship strikes us as a case of using the child as a means to the realization of the
parent’s own goals in a way that has nothing to do with the value of relationship. On
inspection, then, this aspect of MacLeod’s claim turns out not to appeal to relationship
goods after all.
By contrast, the second thought, that “we can see ourselves carried forward in
another self we played a significant role in creating”, does seem to put something special
about the relationship between parent and child centre stage. The claim that there is
something distinctively and importantly valuable, for an adult, about raising a child as an
unsubstitutable act of “creative self-extension” does have the same form as our appeal to
“familial relationship goods”. Though the content differs, the thought is that it is only by
raising a child that adults can realize this particular, and weighty, contribution to human
flourishing.
11 For the view that, when it comes to improving their children’s lives, it is wrong for
parents to be guided by reasons that their children could come reasonably to reject, see
Clayton (2006, 2012).
Let us explore this alternative specification of the value of parenting by looking at
Edgar Page’s account, which is the fullest articulation of such a view that we are aware
of.12 Page is concerned to identify a conception of parenthood that is robust and attractive
enough plausibly to ground a set of parental rights. That is a project with which we have
a good deal of sympathy (and pursue elsewhere).13 Here we confine ourselves to Page’s
approach to the value of parenting, with which we disagree strongly. For him:
parents have a positive desire to influence the course of a child’s life, to
guide the child from infancy to maturity, a desire to mould it, to shape its
life, to fix its basic values and broad attitude, to lay the foundations of its
lifestyle, its priorities, its most general beliefs and convictions, and in
general to determine, to whatever degree is reasonable and possible, the
kind of person the child will become. It would not be going too far to say
that parents have a general propensity to try to send their children forward
in their own image, not in every detail, but in broad outline. (Page, 1984:
195)
We do not dispute this as an empirical claim about a “general propensity” on the part of
parents. The question is whether the desire of adults to shape a child in this way—to
determine the kind of person she will become—should count as an interest weighty
12 For a more recent (though more subtle) account along these lines, explicitly presented
as a critique of our view, see Reshef (2013).
13 Our theory of familial relationship goods yields a radically different account of
parents’ rights from that implied by Page’s approach. See Brighouse and Swift (2006,
2009, forthcoming).
enough to constitute a parent-centred justification of the practice of children being raised
by parents. If somebody proposed that children should be raised collectively, say in state-
run childrearing institutions, there would indeed be compelling objections, appealing to
the interests of both children and adults. But would the fact that those collective
arrangements denied adults the opportunity creatively to extend themselves via their
children be one of them?
As before, it is important carefully to identify the specific claim at stake. Parents
inevitably influence, even though they don’t “determine”, the people their children
become. Our own account of the adult interest in the parent–child relationship describes a
relationship in which there is plenty of room for such influence to occur, whether as
unintended by-product, deliberate concern for shared values, or parental concern for the
child’s well-being. With respect to the last of these, Page (1984: 196) is admirably clear:
We can normally expect parents to pursue their interest in shaping the
child’s future with a clear regard for its good. But this does not mean that
the parental interest in shaping the child can be reduced to this affection. .
. . The propensity of parents to exercise control and guidance over their
children, the propensity to determine the development of the child, far
from being aimed simply or primarily at the child’s good, is the
manifestation of a fundamental and unique interest which lies at the heart
of human parenthood and at the foundation of parental rights.
To our minds, this clarification, emphasizing the extent to which the motive in question
views the child as a vehicle for the realization of the parent’s own selfish, and indeed
somewhat narcissistic, interests, brings out the latent proprietarianism in the “creative
self-extension” account.14 The child is seen as a canvas on which the parent may
objectify herself, or a block of raw marble to be shaped into a future version of herself.
But children are entirely separate people from their parents. If collective childrearing
arrangements were better for them, the fact that such arrangements would deny adults this
particular opportunity for creative self-extension hardly constitutes a ground for insisting
that children should be raised by parents.
As he develops his view, Page also articulates well what we take to be a common
belief about the importance of adults’ parenting children they have physically produced.
For him:
The parental aim is not simply the creation of a person, but rather the
creation of a person in the parents’ own image. . . . One aspect is that in
raising their child parents do much to shape the person it will become.
This they would do in any case, even if it were not part of their design, but
I have argued that parents characteristically have a positive desire to
determine the kind of person their child becomes. The other aspect is that
natural parents produce from their own bodies the material to be shaped,
the organism that is to become a person. (Page, 1984: 200)
For Page, then, the creative dimension of parenting would not adequately be
acknowledged by childrearing arrangements that allowed parents to determine the kind of
people their children become but allocated children to parents in ways that gave no
fundamental importance to any genetic connection between parent and child.
Physically producing the child is itself an essential part of the creative process:
14 Cf. Austin (2004: 507–9).
The motive, or the end, of parenthood is surely the creation of the whole
person, and this takes within its grasp both the begetting and the raising of
the child. . . . The two parts—begetting and rearing—are clearly
complementary to each other and neither is entirely intelligible, as a form
of human activity, without the other. (Page, 1984: 199–200)
An obvious problem for such an account, as for all that attach great significance to
biological connection, is that it seems to rule out the possibility that adoptive parents can
fully realize the value of parenting. Even if they were indeed engaging in the kind of
creative self-extension that comes through raising a child, they would inevitably be
denied the aspect that comes from having physically created the child they are raising.
His response is worth quoting at length:
If all parents were in the position of adoptive parents, i.e. if there were no
connection between parenthood and generation, as might be imagined in
“science fiction” worlds, parenthood would not have a place of special
value in human life, or not the place it now has. Adoptive parenthood is
modelled on natural parenthood and the commitment of adoptive parents
to the child is parasitic on the special bond characteristic of natural
parents. Without this model there would be a question as to the
intelligibility of a commitment of adoptive parents to young babies,
particularly in conditions which severely test them, and indeed as to the
intelligibility of their desire for parenthood. (Would it be comparable to
the desire for pets?) For most people, I suspect, adopting a child falls short
of being a perfect substitute for natural parenthood, but when they
undertake it they can at least borrow from and follow the established
patterns and practice and attitudes of parenthood grounded on the physical
relation. It is difficult to know what adoptive parenthood would be without
this. (Page, 1984: 201)
Where Page believes we can only make sense of adoptive parenthood by thinking of it as
parasitic on a parent–child relationship that is grounded in a physical (i.e.
biological/natural) connection between parent and child, we have tried to explain the
value of parenthood in ways that make no reference to that connection. We accept that, in
a world where there were no connection between parenthood and generation, parenthood
would have a different significance from that which it has for most people today. But we
reject the claim that, in such a world, raising a child would be like keeping a pet. Our aim
has been to highlight the specificity of the parent–child relationship, and to identify the
distinctive and weighty contribution it can make to human well-being. If we are right,
there is no reason for adoptive parents to model themselves on anybody, for what is
special about the practice of parenting does not depend on a biological or natural
connection between parent and child.
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